The National Security Concept  
(informative section)

1. Introduction

The National Security Concept (hereinafter – the Concept) is a document based on the Analysis of Threats to the State that includes the basic strategic principles and priorities for the prevention of threats to the state that have to be considered while developing new documents for policy planning, regulatory enactments, and action plans regarding national security.

The Analysis of Threats to the State and this Concept include information about factors that directly and significantly affect the national security of the Republic of Latvia and are linked to changes in the international security environment, military activities near the Latvian border, tendencies of international terrorism, cyber security, as well as attempts of separate countries to influence the unity of Latvian society, the direction of foreign affairs and internal stability by creating political, humanitarian, informative, and economic pressure.

The Concept includes the main priorities for prevention of relevant threats. Policy created by the state administrative bodies, planned and implemented measures, as well as mutual cooperation regarding national security must be based on the priorities laid out in the Concept. The Cabinet of Ministers develops the National Defence Plan that is based on the priorities outlined in the Concept. The plan includes measures and tools for prevention and neutralising of the specific threat.

2. National Security and National Security Policy

National security is a state, attained as a result of joint, purposeful measures implemented by the country, that ensures improvement of internal and external security of the Republic of Latvia, as well as improves general abilities and readiness for detection, prevention, and overcoming of threats to the national security.

The national security of the Republic of Latvia includes dimensions of interconnected internal and external policies. The dimension of external policy is characterised by the current international security environment, its changes, and external threats. On the other hand, the dimension of internal policy is characterised by provision of fundamental values established in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, as well as a strong civil society that has a unified understanding about its value orientation, the identity of the Republic of Latvia in regard to the
Western world that wants to see Latvia as an independent, democratic, and legitimate country also in the future – a country that is ready to protect itself during critical situations.

The capacity and ability of the borders of the country, national safety authorities, law enforcement agencies, as well as the State Border Guard regarding reaction in case of threats are very significant aspects that contribute to both the internal and external dimension of the national security of the Republic of Latvia.

The basis for the national security policy of the Republic of Latvia must be a unified understanding between the decision makers and society in regard to the stability and security of internal policy that is closely connected to the international security situation. The stronger the internal policy of the Republic of Latvia is, the more effective it will be when reacting and reducing vulnerability caused by external factors.

Being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter – NATO) and European Union (hereinafter – EU) is an important basic element of the national security of the Republic of Latvia. The decisions made in the 2014 Wales Summit regarding the measures of strengthening the collective defence capabilities of NATO and improvement of reaction and defence capabilities of the member states help to ensure the strength of this basic element. At the same time, it must be understood that being a member of NATO does not solve all issues regarding the national security of the Republic of Latvia and does not provide defence against several significant threats that arise from the vulnerability of the internal policy of the Republic of Latvia.

EU work in the security and defence field has a supplementary role to the collective defence measures of NATO. As the so-called hybrid threat is growing, the more attention must be directed towards strengthening fields that are not within the competencies of the Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, border security, security of information and cyberspace, energy security, etc.

Latvia has to favour further involvement of other international organisations, such as the United Nations Organisation, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Council of Europe, in stabilisation of the international security situation by searching for solutions to the crisis in Ukraine, increasing its stability, territorial integrity, as well as developing democracy and European values.

The national security policy is a set of measures directed towards detection, prevention, and
overcoming of threats to the national security. The spectrum of threats to the national security of the Republic of Latvia exceeds the competencies of defence and interior affairs system institutions. It means that to detect, prevent, and overcome threats to the national security the country has to involve all state administration bodies. Considering the great number of institutions involved, the centralised control of the national security policy and mutual cooperation of these institutions are very important factors. The fact that administrative institutions have a unified understanding about the term of national security, most common threats to the national security of the Republic of Latvia, and the most effective combating methods is of the same importance. Interinstitutional cooperation mechanisms must be effective daily, but each institution has to undertake the initiative to solve issues within the obligation framework of the respective institution. The understanding and support of the society is very important for the state administration institutions to implement the national security policy, however, such support and understanding can be ensured if the society in questioned is well educated in the specific field. Thus provision of information about the national security to the society is one of the priorities for implementing the national security policy.

3. Changes within the International Security Environment and the Effects on the National Security

Since the approval of the previous Concept in 2011, the international security environment has undergone significant changes. It is characterised by instability and unpredictability, as well as formation of new conflicts, including those that are comparatively near the Latvian border.

The aggression in Ukraine fuelled by the Russian Federation has presented significant challenges to the security in Europe and global international order. The aggression in Ukraine fuelled by the Russian Federation has been an unprecedented attack on the basic principles of the international rights since the end of WWII. These rights define, for example, execution of signed agreements, inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. These basic principles establish the international relations of countries and have been the basis for peaceful coexistence in Europe after the war. Latvia together with EU and NATO has condemned and continues to condemn the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, and has expressed that these actions are unacceptable and threaten the security of Europe.

The actions of the Russian Federation have significantly worsen the security within the Euro-Atlantic area and have created long-term effects on the national security of the Republic of Latvia. The aggression and policy carried out by the Russian Federation in the territory of
Ukraine can be characterised by separate tendencies that have to be taken into consideration while planning the measures for detection, prevention, and overcoming of threats to the national security of the Republic of Latvia.

Firstly, the operation of the Russian Federation carried out in the territory of Ukraine has shown the current abilities and readiness of Russia. It is clear that the Russian Federation has developed high readiness and mobility military units that significantly reduce the reaction time of early defence systems.

Secondly, the Russian Federation implements its foreign policy by using complex measures that causes so-called hybrid threats. These measures have various manifestations that simultaneously include several areas. The main nature of these measures is gradual weakening of the country by use of internal policy. These measures increase the potential of discontent and protests of the society in order to create open movement against the current leading political force, as well as create violent social unrest. Additionally, the Russian Federation uses economic sanctions, suspension of energy supply, humanitarian influence, informative propaganda, and psychological influence, as well as cyber attacks, aggressive influence agents and surveillance and security agencies, massive external diplomatic and military pressure, and enforcement and legitimisation of alternative political process. These tools also include the ability to launch a traditional military attack. Often it is very difficult to identify the subjects and manifestations of these measures, thus it is more difficult to counter them.

Thirdly, the Russian Federation benefits from creating a conflict area near its border, in which the transition from peaceful existence to crisis and later to war is very difficult to identify.

Fourthly, the Russian Federation benefits from creating a fictional notion that NATO causes external threats due to internal policy. The government of the Russian Federation implements these measures to rally the society and make it loyal to the current government, simultaneously turning the attention of the society away from internal instability and socio-economic issues. In the context of the national security of the Republic of Latvia these actions cause threats because Latvia is a NATO member state in which military personnel from other NATO member states is located to ensure the security of the country. The Russian Federation not only continues its negative rhetoric against the NATO military personnel being stationed in Latvia by trying to rally the people of Latvia against the notion, but also will try to provoke, for example, will set its military aircraft on course within the airspace of the Republic of Latvia or near it, as well as
organise military training near the Latvian border.

The Russian Federation carries out influence measures also against Latvia, thus elements of so-called hybrid threat can be identified also in Latvia. A complex and long-term action must be carried out in order to reduce and prevent these elements. The ever growing confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West, aggressive demonstration of military capacity, and increasing of the capacity in the strategic direction of the West cause tension and uncertainty. Additionally, informative propaganda disorientates the society and decision making. These risk factors require to increase the national security measures in the Republic of Latvia and Baltic region.

Significant threats to Europe come from the instability in the Middle East region. These threat sources are linked to destabilisation of separate countries in the region, increase of the number of refugees and asylum seekers, possible trade of weapons of mass destruction, radicalisation of the society of these countries, and increasing threats of terrorism.

Threats to the national security caused by international terrorism and its consequences have increased. In recent years, terrorism has developed into a complex and extensive issue that not only challenges the safety and stability of countries, but also is directed against common basic values. ISIL/Da'esh terrorist organisation is considered to cause very significant threat because, due to its actions and methods, the organisation has become a driving force for other organisations, thus establishing new tendencies in so-called global jihad. Significant threat has arisen from so-called foreign fighter phenomenon that includes people with financial problems or due to their ideology travelling to the conflict areas in order to fight for the terrorist organisation. Radicalisation of these people and threats they create after returning to their origin countries, including Europe, are long-term threats that have not been fully identified yet. This requires cooperation on national and international level in order to prevent further expansion of the phenomenon.

International economic processes significantly affect the international security environment, specifically ever growing competition between countries, economic integration processes on regional and international level, as well as mutual dependence on import, export, and production process within the control context. The international economic crisis and falling economic issues in EU and globally clearly identify the link between economic issues and other security elements.
4. Priorities for Prevention of Threats to the National Security

4.1. Prevention of Threats to the Internal Security

One of the elements characterising the internal security without a united civil society, stable economic environment, and powerful mass media is the level of safety and stability the inhabitants feel in their daily life in the country, as well as the level of their trust to the capacity of security authorities (the Constitution Protection Bureau, Security Police, and military intelligence and security service) and law enforcement agencies for protection of the society in case of various kinds of threats.

State security authorities and institutions that protect rights, as well as the State Border Guard are directly responsible for the protection of separate basic values established in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. These values include independence of the state, democratic system, territorial integrity, and internal security of the country.

In the context of internal security, it is important that these institutions have professional understanding about various changes in the international environment and their general effects on the national security – the institutions have to be able to provide a relevant response to the current situation, and their capacity must develop even further in the future.

In order to improve the internal security, it is necessary to strengthen reaction capacity, modernise the current technical and material equipment and purchase new equipment, as well as increase human resources capacity of law enforcement agencies, particularly the State Police and State Border Guard.

As one of the priorities for drafting the medium-term budgetary framework of 2015 the government has brought forward the internal and external security. This means that the government also will provide support to officials with specific ranking, thus preventing professional personnel from leaving the country and increasing the capacity of the internal security measures.

The personnel stationed on the eastern border of Latvia would be the first defence line to come into contact with external threat. The State Police also have to be ready to immediately react in situations that include open aggression towards the current state authority, for example protests and violent social unrest. Provision and maintenance of this level of readiness require a
relevant approach and specific training that has to be purposefully developed.

Threats to the internal security of the Republic of Latvia are caused by inhabitants, specifically youth, of Latvia who take part in various activities that juxtapose the national interests of the Republic of Latvia. In order to confine such activities, it is very important to put in order the regulatory framework. In 2015, the Saeima adopted amendments in the Criminal Law that establish that people will be held criminally liable for unlawfully taking part in an armed conflict, funding an armed conflict, as well as recruiting, training and sending other persons to armed conflicts. It is very important that the state administration institutions continue the development of the regulatory framework in order to limit the possibility of children and young people participating in military training camps located in other countries.

Considering the significant increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, as well as the decision of the Republic of Latvia to provide support for a set number of refugees, it is concluded that this issue will create new threats and challenges to the internal security of the Republic of Latvia in the near future. Difficult geopolitic situation, refugees taken by the Republic of Latvia, and the increasing numbers of refugees will create tension and insecurity within the society in the future. The issue of refugees will increase radicalisation rate of certain parts of the society, and this phenomenon will be used by separate, including radical, organisations that will try to combine their resources and concentrate their activities by protesting against support to refugees and their dislocation in the Republic of Latvia.

**Priorities of the Republic of Latvia Regarding the Prevention of Threats to the Internal Security:**

**Strengthening of Security and Defence Capacity of the State Border**

Strengthening of security and defence capacity of the state border must be carried out due to possible external threats because the eastern border of the Republic of Latvia also is the outer border of EU and NATO, as well as an immigration route. The capacity of human resources and material and technical equipment of the State Border Guard must be increased in order to strengthen the security of the state border. Special attention must be directed towards staff training, as well as developing a green border and equipping it with the necessary technical units.

If the capacity of the State Border Guard is to be increased, the issue of the compatibility of its material and technical equipment, training process, and response procedure with the National
Armed Forces (hereinafter – NAF) must be addressed.

The demarcation process of the state border must be continued by installing a 12 metre border area, which includes deforestation work and land dispossession, as well as planning the technical solutions for the area, and attracting funding from EU and strategic partners. At the same time, the measures regarding the integrated state border management must be continued to be implemented.

**Capacity of the Law Enforcement Agencies**

The capacity and material and technical equipment of law enforcement agencies, particularly the State Police, must be continued to improve by carrying out effective training, thus ensuring quick response in the case of crisis or threats to the state.

The cooperation between the State Police and society must be continued to be developed by making the officials of the State Police accessible to the inhabitants in all the territory of the Republic of Latvia, if a threat occurs.

**Management of Crisis and Communication**

The civil protection system and military cooperation must be developed and strengthen by establishing harmonised interinstitutional operation and use of resources in case of threats.

The responsible state administration institutions in cooperation with state security institutions must continue to provide regular crisis management training for the highest state officials in order to prepare for prevention and overcoming measures in case of possible national security threats.

In order to prevent national security threats the responsible state administration institutions have to insure the execution of measures laid out in the Economy Mobilisation Plan.

**Development of the Policy for Refugees and Asylum Seekers**

The country must in due time prepare for possible increase of the number of refugees and asylum seekers, including countries the asylum seekers and refugees of which did not choose Latvia as their primary destination. The responsible institutions have to develop the current policy and procedures for refugees and asylum seekers in order to ensure readiness in case of
necessity to provide support for the newly arrived refugees and asylum seekers.

The responsible institutions have to draft the necessary procedures for profiling of refugees and asylum seekers in order to prevent persona non grata, especially from terrorism risk countries, entering and staying in the Republic of Latvia. Additionally, active information exchange concerning refugee issues with other countries and their responsible institutions must be provided.

**Reduction of the Radicalisation Risk**

The capacity of law enforcement agencies must be strengthen in order to pre-emptively identify the risk of radicalisation. These agencies must work together with non-governmental organisations to develop an early warning system and radicalisation prevention mechanisms – one of the main role in these efforts has to be attributed to the society.

In order to reduce the risk of radicalisation, it is very important to educate the society by promoting the understanding about extremism being a serious threat to the civil society and its unity, as well as to the national security in general.

**4.2. Prevention of Threats Caused by Intelligence and Security Agencies of Other Countries**

Action of foreign intelligence and security agencies (hereinafter – the Special Services) against the interests of the Republic of Latvia, NATO, and EU is one of the most significant threats to the national security that involves political, economic, military, and public spheres. Considering the fact that Latvia is a member of NATO and EU, as well as the geographic location of the country, the biggest threat comes from the Russian Special Services.

The goal of the Russian Special Services is to procure publicly accessible information that would provide an advantage to the country that uses these services in making political, economic, and military decisions. Foreign special services not only gather information, but also executes so-called active measures that try to affect the decision making of the Republic of Latvia, NATO, and EU, as well as the opinion of the society in these territories.

In order to achieve the surveillance goals, the foreign special services use various methods: acquisition of information from contact persons and information sources, technical and signal intelligence, as well as cyber intelligence, acquisition of information from disclosed sources. To
execute various influence measures, the foreign special services try to establish a network of controlled agents in the mass media, state and municipality institutions, as well as in the non-governmental, political and business environment. More and more attention is directed towards the virtual space and social networks, in which the foreign special services can act remotely. The intelligence and influence abilities are developed in long-term with the purpose of activation of the abilities when a specific situation arises or the abilities are necessary to carry out a specific project.

The Republic of Latvia continues to issue fixed period residence permits in exchange for investments in the country. Currently, the implementation of the fixed period residence permits programme does not affect the national security directly, but it is very important to identify and prevent separate risks regarding illegal entrance into the territory of the Republic of Latvia and the Schengen area of persona non grata.

The strategic goal of the country is to provide a set of pre-emptive and preventive measures to neutralise threats to the interests of the Republic of Latvia, NATO, and EU created by the foreign special services. The priorities must include strengthening and development of the current state security authorities in compliance with the current types of threats.

Priorities of the Republic of Latvia in Regard to Prevention of Threats Created by the Foreign Intelligence and Security Agencies:

Development of the Capacity of Security Authorities

State security authorities must be capable to adjust to new types of threats created by the foreign special services, as well as to establish new solutions for the prevention of current threats. Strengthening of capacity and development of abilities is a long-term priority objective for the security authorities of the Republic of Latvia. A great attention must be directed towards selection of personnel and regular training, introduction of new technologies and solutions, as well as improvement of methods and increase in efficiency of daily operative and analytic work.

Strengthening of Counterintelligence and Preventive Measures

The objective for the state security authorities is to carry out continuous counterintelligence measures by identifying the members of foreign special services, their partners, interests, and operating methods. In order to increase the effectiveness of counterintelligence functions carried out by the state security authorities, it is necessary to improve the ability to project potential
weaknesses, as well as the goals of the foreign special services, thus providing targeted countermeasures and threat prevention capabilities.

The state security authorities have to introduce comprehensive preventive training and warning programmes to the state administration institutions that work with sensitive, classified or strategic information. The basis for an effective counterintelligence system is systematic training, as well as notification order for officials that directly work with classified information.

The Security Police must continue cooperation and information exchange with municipalities in order to be able to inform them about current threats to the national security and provide consultations to officials about specific measures to be taken to reduce these threats, as well as to receive information from municipalities about suspicious activities within municipality territories that cause potential threats.

Educational work with the society in general, mass media representatives, and non-governmental sector must be continued in order to strengthen the understanding about various threats, particularly those that are present in the information space.

**Improvement of the State Secret Protection Measures**

State security authorities have to ensure the protection of state secrets and, if necessary, have to improve the protection measures. These measures include inspection of persons who are candidates for work with state secrets, as well as monitoring of the daily work with the objects of state secrets. The state security authorities have to continue to provide regular training of state officials about working under the confidentiality regime.

Special attention regarding the development of threats and new intelligence tools must be directed towards the security of the classified communications and communications of national significance. The physical objects (premises) of various state institutions also must be systematically inspected and they must comply to the relevant security requirements. The state security institutions have to thoroughly control the compliance of the development, storage, circulation, and use order of the state secret objects of the country, EU, and NATO with the requirements stipulated in regulatory enactments.

Representatives of critical infrastructure and strategic industries, especially those who have received industrial safety certificates, must ensure relevant training, inspections, and security
auditing programmes in the critical infrastructure objects, as well as specific enterprises.

**Effective Control of the Fixed Period Residence Permits Programme**

The Security Police and other responsible institutions have to continue a systematic and targeted work in order to prevent the possibility that the fixed period residence permits programme is used for activities that threaten the national security.

At the same time, the activities of persons received a fixed period residence permit must be monitored in order to determine whether these activities comply with the declared goal for which the fixed period residence permit is issued.

To research the operation of the fixed period residence permits programme, it is necessary to perform a long-term analysis that would allow both to objectively evaluate the potential benefits for the country and to provide an early warning about possible risks in the future.

**Strengthening of Cooperation with Partners**

Mutual cooperation in the Republic of Latvia and between institutions of allied countries is an irreplaceable tool for prevention and identification of various threats caused by foreign special services. The framework of the state security authorities council includes regular and effective identification of priorities, operation coordination, and exchange of information.

Within the frameworks of EU, NATO, and other current and new frameworks, the cooperation between services of foreign partners must be continuously developed by providing regular exchange of information and experience. The state security authorities must also actively contribute to provide pre-emptive prevention of threats to NATO and EU.

**4.3. Prevention of Military Threats**

The extent of external risks and threats to the national security of the Republic of Latvia has significantly grown. The current security environment is complex and includes reciprocal interaction between military and non-military aspects. The aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, its military training, and demonstration of force near the border of the Republic of Latvia, as well as the efforts to affect the domestic policy by use of various economic and political tools establishes a need to form a comprehensive threat prevention approach.

The strategic basic principle of provision of the Latvian military security remains fixed – by
continuing to improve and modernise the national security capacity, supporting the collective
defence mechanism of NATO, and contributing to the provision of the international security, the
Republic of Latvia reduces the risk of external military aggression or other threats and, if
necessary, is prepared to launch effective countermeasures.

Priorities of the Republic of Latvia Regarding Monitoring of the Military Threats:

Strengthening of Self-Defence Capabilities of the Country

State self-defence is a responsibility of the society, state institutions, local municipalities, and
NAF, and is achieved by ensuring sovereignty and inviolability of the country. A critical part of
the self-defence capacity is quick identification of threats and fast decision making, and
comprehensive government measures, using all available military and non-military resources in a
coordinated and integrated way. The use of military and non-military resources complies with
the increase of a specific threat and violence level within the territory of the Republic of Latvia,
as well as with civil and military cooperation principles.

In the case of a threat to the state, NAF and allied armed forces secure the land and sea
borders, as well as the airspace of the Republic of Latvia. A very important task for the state self-
defence is to develop a strong support system that could allow fast reception and deployment of
allied forces within the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

In the case of threats to the national security, it is very important NAF work in cooperation
with the State Fire and Rescue Service that is responsible for coordination and control of the
civil defence system, thus providing the necessary support.

NAF must continue to maintain and improve combat capabilities that ensure fast response to
all possible challenges in the early stages of threats, thus developing compatibility with other
state institutions involved in overcoming of the threats, as well as establishing an effective and
flexible system for reserve and mobilisation. NAF must continue to develop cooperation and
establish mechanisms for better coordination between the Baltic states, as well as those allied
countries that are interested in and are directly involved in strengthening of the security of the
Baltic Sea Region.

The country must promote citizenship, patriotism, direct and broad involvement of the society
in regard to provision of the national security.
Long-term Presence of the Allied Forces and Strengthening of the Response Capacity

The collective defence system of NATO guarantees the security and defence of the Republic of Latvia, as well as ensures that possible military threats against Latvia are considered to be threats against the whole alliance.

Considering changes in the security environment, the Republic of Latvia is interested in promoting comprehensive NATO adjustments to the new security situation that would be directed towards improvement of the efficiency of the command structure of the alliance, reorganisation of the NATO Response Force and creation of a fast response group that would allow the alliance to act and fully respond to all possible threats within a few days.

At the same time, the demonstration of collective capacity and solidarity of NATO, as well as strengthening of the eastern borders, particularly in the Baltic Sea Region and territory of the Republic of Latvia become more and more important. Presence of the allied forces is the most effective solution for the military security and defence of the Republic of Latvia. This solution ensures deterrence, closer integration with the NATO defence structures and armed forces, improves the reception and deployment capacity of the allied forces, as well as strengthens the defence positions of the Baltic Sea Region as the eastern flank for the alliance.

Implementation of the Collective Defence Obligations

The Republic of Latvia undertakes to carry out the NATO collective defence obligations laid out in Article 5 and strengthen security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Republic of Latvia will continue to provide support for the NATO and EU fast response combat formations, participate in international operations, develop the necessary collective defence capacity, as well as purposefully contribute to NAF development and modernisation. In order to be able to fulfil the undertaken international obligations, execute the planned NAF modernisation, as well as to respond to the challenges and threats caused by the current international environment, the Republic of Latvia has to allocate at least 2% from its GDP to the national security.

4.4. Prevention of Threats to the Unity of the Civil Society

A united civil society that believes in unified basic values is an important precondition for reduction of the vulnerability of the domestic policy of the Republic of Latvia, as well as strengthening of the national security.
These basic values must include those of an independent and democratic country that is a part of the Western world. The responsibility regarding these basic values is not to be undertaken only by the state. Inhabitants must show an initiative and take a bigger part in socio-political processes within the country, thus establishing non-governmental organisations, participating in the work of political parties, as well as the inhabitants must be ready to protect their country in the case of an external threat.

Threats to the unity of the society and stability of the domestic policy are caused by the national and informative policy implemented by the relevant institutions of the Russian Federation. The implementation of these policies allows the Russian Federation to carry out targeted division of the Latvian society that increases tension between and estrangement of different groups of the society. The Russian Federation tries to influence the public opinion and wants to gradually change the opinions about historical facts, current political processes in the world, the fact that Latvia is a member of NATO and EU so that it would be beneficial for Russia.

Efforts to create disbelief of the society in its country and state administration institutions also have been identified. It is done to create distrust between the society and government and make the society indifferent to the country or even negative towards it, thus reaching a point where the society cannot properly function and organise.

The national and informative policies carried out by the Russian Federation against the Republic of Latvia for a long time include such topics as strengthening the status of the Russian language, increasing accessibility to education in the Russian language, protection of the rights of fellow countrymen and non-citizens, accusations of the Republic of Latvia in regard to rebirth of fascism and Nazism, as well as various emphasis on the role of Russia in the history of Latvia and the seeming separation of Latgale region from the rest of the Republic of Latvia. The actualisation of these topics is used to internationally discredit the Republic of Latvia and aggravate the domestic policy in the Republic of Latvia, thus threatening the unity of the society.

Priorities of the Republic of Latvia Regarding the Prevention of Threats to the Unity of the Civil Society:

Participation of the Civil Society in Socio-political Processes

It is necessary to carry out a purposeful civil society policy in the Republic of Latvia by allocating constant part of the budget to various measures for strengthening the civil society
It is necessary to carry out measures and create relevant conditions that would be able to improve the participation and involvement of the civil society in socio-political processes of the Republic of Latvia. At the same time, the society must start to feel responsible about the defence of the country and strengthening of the national security. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to improve the involvement of the society in the defence measures of the country by establishing an understanding about various risks and threats to the national security that can affect inhabitants; it is also necessary to develop knowledge and skills, so that the inhabitants would be able to respond in the case of crisis.

**Development of the Capacity of Strategic Communication of the Country**

In order to achieve more successful involvement of the society, the strategic communication between the high ranking government officials and society in general, as well as separate its groups, for example, entrepreneurs and representatives of the non-governmental sector is very important. The government must pay special attention to strategic communication with regions and municipalities, as well as the people who live in these regions.

By implementing effective strategic communication, the gap between the society and country, as well as the separation of the regions of the Republic of Latvia and Riga, the centre for national level decision making, would be decreased.

**Implementation of the Society Integration Policy**

It is necessary to improve coordination between the responsible institutions that are implementing the society integration policy. Functions of the institutions regarding integration must be defined more precisely in order to prevent duplication of such functions.

When carrying out long-term society integration policy, it must include a complex of measures for such areas as language, education, history, youth, etc. that would allow to preemptively prevent the threats to the national security of the Republic of Latvia caused by the national and informative policy carried out by the Russian Federation.

The society integration must be implemented together with an effective national language policy, thus ensuring that all inhabitants can communicate in the Latvian language, as well as successfully understand the information provided by the government using public and other
media. The national language policy must be directed towards improvement in daily use of the Latvian language, as well as it must provide systematic access to language courses for non-citizens and immigrants.

In order to ensure sustainable development of the unity of the civil society, it is necessary to implement an education policy that would establish similar values, create national consciousness, and develop a unified social memory for all of the new generation irrespective of ethnic origin and language spoken in each family.

Minorities must be considered as a very important part of the civil society of the Republic of Latvia. The government of the Republic of Latvia must purposefully develop the involvement of minorities in socio-political processes by providing a definite support in regard to initiative. Involvement of the minorities in the public administration would reduce the estrangement from the country and prevent the risk of development of a bi-communal society; support to individual initiatives from the representatives of the minorities would serve as a positive stimulus for the development of the activity of the civil society, as well as it would improve economic growth.

In regard to the society integration, it is necessary to develop various measures that are based on the same values and have a positive potential for unification of the society, for example, celebration of public holidays and development of common culture events.

4.5. Prevention of the Threats to Information Space of the Republic of Latvia

Nowadays, information space is a wide concept because technologies do not provide borders for it – the inhabitants of the Republic of Latvia can freely choose their information sources, including those that do not originate in Latvia and express opinions that juxtapose the national interests. It is difficult to limit the choice of the inhabitants of the Republic of Latvia, as well as to control provision and entrance of undesirable information into the information space of Latvia; and various aspects make this task practically impossible. It is not only a problem of the Republic of Latvia, but also other democratic countries because such limitations can contradict the basic principles of democracy – freedom of press, prohibition of censorship, as well as principles of free market and competition in regard to the mass media sector.

The policy carried out by the Russian Federation includes various means of influence that help to create a public opinion favourable to the Russian Federation is the main external threat to the information space of the Republic of Latvia because, in order to achieve this goal, a consistent presence of the information space of the Russian Federation has been established, and
it creates significant and in many cases unequal competition in the Latvian information space. In order to develop a favourable public opinion, the Russian Federation uses a wide variety of instruments that are specifically created for different audiences. These instruments include various television and radio stations of the Russian Federation that retransmit content created in Russia. The work of the Russian Federation is made easier by poor journalistic sources available in the Russian language because the Russian speaking population in the Republic of Latvia is more dependants on the information provided by Russia; the tendencies observed in the last few years also indicate this trend. Additionally, the Russian Federation plans to implement several specific projects developed to increase influence in the television and radio industries, as well as the Internet environment; such measures would extend not only within the territory of the Republic of Latvia, but also within other European countries.

The public opinion in the Republic of Latvia is being influenced by providing several messages that can change in regard the respective target audience. These messages include efforts to develop a positive opinion about the Russian Federation. This message is complimented by another message indicating that the Western world is experiencing an economic crisis and degradation of values. A notion that NATO will not be able protect Latvia in the case of external threats is artificially developed in the society of the Republic of Latvia, as well as a notion that EU has not been able to ensure economic growth and prosperity in Latvia. Using various messages, in long-term distrust to the Republic of Latvia, its officials, state institutions, and politicians is established, thus widening the gap between the society and state, as well as increasing the psychological insecurity about the possible future.

The influence of external threats on the information space of the Republic of Latvia is very effective because it interacts with several internal factors. They include the ethnic composition of the Republic of Latvia, different languages used in families, as well as the use of the mass media by middle age and older people that is also partially brought over to the youngest generation. The information space of the Republic of Latvia is still devided in two specific parts – information in the Latvian language and information in the Russian language. The efficiency of the Russian Federation within the information space of the Republic of Latvia is increased due to accessibility of the Russian mass media and the fact that a large part of the society prefers to use them as the primary information source. A part of the audience, including Latvians, is still used to watch Russian television channels because they form a big section of channel packages available to the clients.
Priorities of the Prevention of Threats to Information Space of the Republic of Latvia:

Development of the Public Media

The public media of the Republic of Latvia must be considered as a part of the national security system and, similarly to other parts of the national security system, the public media also needs a larger funding than it currently has.

The public media has to work with different target audiences and must be available within all territory of the Republic of Latvia. One of the most specific target audiences in the Republic of Latvia is the minorities. It is important to develop and offer a high quality and understandable alternative to the information sources representing the information space of the Russian Federation, thus providing various options to choose from. The public media also must report information about activities in the regions of the Republic of Latvia. These measures could promote the awareness of people living in Riga and other cities about the current state of regions, thus making the regions more attractive and increasing their development capacity. At the same time, this would show that Riga also is interested in the problems people living in the countryside have, thus decreasing the notion of social exclusion.

Reduction of Influence of the Information Space of the Russian Federation

An effective mass media monitoring and supervision system must be established in order to reduce the possible development of a stable Russian information space within the information space of the Republic of Latvia. In order to carry out this intention, it is necessary to put in order the regulatory framework to prevent a situation in which various mass media sources that are registered in other countries could freely operate and disseminate information that juxtaposes the interests of the Republic of Latvia within the territory of Latvia.

In order to reduce the influence of the information space of the Russian Federation, in addition to an effective regulatory framework along-term alternative must be established. At the same time, the public media must be developed by providing more diverse commercial television and cable television offers, so that consumers could choose audiovisual materials developed in Europe.

Development of the Media Literacy and Media Education

The country in cooperation with commercial media and public media must pay attention to
education of the society about ways of differentiating between objective information, disinformation, and propaganda, thus promoting critical thinking of the society and capacity to analyse, evaluate, and recognise various informative influence measures that allow targeted destruction of trust to the Republic of Latvia and its policies.

4.6. Prevention of Threats to the Economy of the Republic of Latvia

The economic security is one of the most important aspects of the national security that is based on the capacity to ensure stable economic environment and sustainable development of the economy. The stability of the economic system depends on several economic environment factors (openness of the internal market and economic system, predictability of the taxation system and investment environment, size of the shadow economy, etc.), as well as provision of access to production and service resources (raw materials, energy, investments, infrastructure, workforce, etc.). Economic growth is a very important precondition for achievement of the national security goals not only in an immediate threat situation, but also in the long-term. It is very important to promote the economic development and competition, as well as establish additional access points to various new export markets.

The economic environment of Latvia is characterised by several significant aspects that affect economic growth and stability. Systematically, the economic environment of the Republic of Latvia is characterised by the limited access to raw materials and production resources (including funding and energy), small internal market, as well as a direct response to economic processes on international and regional level considering the economic openness and orientation towards the external import and export markets. There are several more important factors that display the vulnerability of the economic environment of the Republic of Latvia. One of these is decreasing number of economically active inhabitants that causes workforce deficit and limits the potential of economic processes in general. The level of shadow economy remains high, thus negatively affecting the economic and investment environment, as well as further increasing the vulnerability of the domestic policy. Tax evasion is one of the characteristics that displays negative attitude of the society towards the policy carried out by the government. Changing this attitude is a long-term work that displays the relation between paid taxes and the ability of the country to invest larger amounts of money into defence, border security, road infrastructure, education, medicine, and social area.

Considering the economic structure, necessity for foreign investments, as well as the situation in the most significant import and export markets of goods and services, the economic growth of
the Republic of Latvia is closely connected with processes in EU. In medium-term, the background of the economic growth of the Republic of Latvia is negatively affected by the average growth of the Eurozone, recession of the economy of the Russian Federation, and trade restrictions. In long-term, strengthening of the economic security requires additional activities in the European and North Atlantic markets, as well as in the rapidly growing Asian and Latin American markets. In regard to investments, the biggest attention must be directed towards attracting new investments for the factual economy sectors from reliable investors. Additionally, the basis of laws and regulations of the Republic of Latvia and principles of good administration in the public and private sector must be continuously developed in order to increase the competitiveness and productivity of the Republic of Latvia.

Because of the limited access to resources, the energy security of the Republic of Latvia is one of the most important issues of the economic and national security. The use of natural gas in the Republic of Latvia continues to decrease, but dependency on only one supplier may potentially grant the ability to create political and economic pressure by manipulating with the prices of the energy resource, conditions and cease of supply. The issue of the energy security must be dealt with in close cooperation between the Republic of Latvia, the Baltic states, and other EU member states.

Transit sector is one of the most important sectors of the economy of the Republic of Latvia, but, while planning its development, it is very important to balance the economic benefit the country gains from this sector and potential risks of becoming even more dependant on separate cargo suppliers and continuing work with low added value cargo. The transit sector also can be used to create political and economic pressure on the Republic of Latvia that could be achieved by ceasing cargo transit through the territory of Latvia, threatening with the loss of income, as well as increase of the unemployment rate within the sector.

The strategic goals for strengthening of the economic security of the Republic of Latvia are: development of a stable and predictable economic environment, promotion of economic growth, diversification of the external export market, provision of alternative suppliers of energy resources, and diversification of suppliers and serviced cargo types.

**Priorities of the Republic of Latvia Regarding Prevention of Economic Threats:**

**Ensuring a Stable and Predictable Economic Environment**

Institutions of the Republic of Latvia must continue to implement balanced economic
development and deliberate fiscal policy on the national level. Special attention must be directed towards combating measures for shadow economy and improvement of taxation process by systematically identifying and evaluating tax evasion risks, as well as introducing relevant control measures. It is important to increase the capacity of the law enforcement agencies and corruption prevention and combating institutions in order to be able to identify, investigate, and solve financial crimes and corporate schemes; it is also important to increase the efficiency of the judicial system in order to achieve faster adjudication of cases. It is necessary to improve monitoring capacity of the financial sector in order to prevent money laundering.

To establish a long-term economic growth, it is very important to be able to use qualified workforce, science and innovations in the business development when developing projects that are guided towards production with high added value. Special attention must be directed towards the development of business initiative in the regions of the Republic of Latvia. In order to achieve these goals, it is necessary to invest in high-quality education, workforce training, development of science and research, as well as the cooperation between scientist and entrepreneurs must be promoted. These goals can be reached by providing additional funds from the state budget, as well as the EU Structural Funds.

**External Economic Policy and Control of Foreign Investment**

Considering the economic connection between economy and various international and regional processes and the necessity to in due time respond to different changes in the economic environment, the Republic of Latvia has to establish an effective access to the decision making processes and protection measures of economic interests within the framework of international and regional organisations. In this context, it is important to continue the protection of national interests in the framework of the World Trade Organisation and EU.

Developing the external economic policy of the Republic of Latvia, it is important to promote investment attraction and diversification of export markets. Recession of the economy of the Russian Federation, as well as its response to the economic sanctions declared by EU, pressure many Latvian businesses, especially those within the food industry, to explore new export markets in order to realise their products. In order to provide support for the entrepreneurs in searches for new markets, the Republic of Latvia has to continue to coordinate its external economic policy, extend the embassy network, and maintain a positive international image of Latvia.
Attraction of new foreign investments requires that the Republic of Latvia implements a deliberate investment regulation policy that would prevent shady investors from influencing strategically significant sectors and cause threats to the national security.

**Security of Energy Supply**

The Republic of Latvia has to establish access to alternative energy sources and competition between energy suppliers; these are important preconditions for the supply of energy resources and competitive prices. The Republic of Latvia in cooperation with the Baltic states and other EU member states must strengthen the energy security in order to provide access to continuous and timely supply of energy resources in the case the usual supply is ceased. In the context of the energy security, one of the most important priorities of the Republic of Latvia is to provide third party access to the natural gas infrastructure in order to liberalise the natural gas market, as well as to separate administration and trade of the natural gas. The Republic of Latvia must continue to work on implementation of the regional energy industry projects regarding the supply of natural gas by installing the necessary interconnections and integrating in the general EU natural gas infrastructure, as well as in the long-term ensuring capacity increase of the baseline electricity and interconnections with the neighbouring countries.

The Republic of Latvia must support the use of technologies that save energy, create new jobs, and are environmentally friendly. In this context, the use of local energy resources is very significant, as it is a key factor for economic growth in the regions of the Republic of Latvia.

**Diversification of Transit Cargo Flow**

Contrary to the efforts of the transit sector to increase the amount of cargo loading and transfer, cargo suppliers, origin countries of cargoes, and supply routes should be diversified. The shift from servicing low added value cargoes in long-term to transportation of more valuable cargoes and adding additional value in the Latvian seaports and logistics terminals has to be made.

The Republic of Latvia has to continue to work on the development of railroad and road infrastructure not only in the direction of east, but also between the other Baltic states, thus providing connection of the road and railroad infrastructure of the Baltic states with the the EU countries. At the same time, the Republic of Latvia and the other Baltic states have to develop common logistics projects, thus creating competition on a regional level not between themselves.
4.7. Prevention of the Threats Created by the International Terrorism

Since 2011, terrorism threats have significantly increased, and it can be explained by the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq that have attracted a significant number of radical Islamists from various European countries with the purpose to join various terrorist groups stationed in these regions. A total number of four to six thousand Islamists has left Europe to join these groups.

The main risks are caused by the fact that these people receive practical and ideological training in these training camps. Such skills and knowledge can be used to plan a terrorist attack in their European countries of origin.

Terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in 2015 prove that people and objects that in the eyes of radical Islamists are considered to be blasphemous to their religion are under the greatest risk of terrorist attacks. Additionally, officials of the law enforcement agencies and soldiers, as well as Jews and relevant objects are under greater threats. Long-term terrorism development trends show that crowded places also are considered as the prime targets for terrorist attacks.

There are no persons, groups or organisations in the Republic of Latvia that are identified to plan to use terrorist tactics in order to achieve their ideological goals. However, there a few individuals in Latvia that have expressed interest of joining Islamist groups based in Syria and Iraq.

The Republic of Latvia is involved in all the processes within the territory of Europe, thus the national security interests still include a significant contribution to fight against the international terrorism in order to prevent the increase of terrorism threats in the member states of NATO and EU. However, the current counter-terrorism system in the Republic of Latvia must be developed further in order to ensure that possible terrorism threats would be prevented in timely fashion.

Priorities of the Republic of Latvia Regarding the Prevention of Threats Caused by the International Terrorism

Involvement in the International Counter-terrorism Operations and International Cooperation

Development of counter-terrorism measures in regions where the bases for international terrorism organisations are located and terrorist training is carried out, as well as plans for terrorist attacks on the member states of EU and NATO are created complies with the interests of
the national security of the Republic of Latvia. This means that the Republic of Latvia and other member states of EU and NATO have to send their forces to participate in the international peace keeping missions in order to support other countries in their efforts to control the situation in their territories; at the same time, these actions prevent terrorist ideas and trends from spreading outside the said regions.

International cooperation plays a significant role in prevention of various threats caused by the international terrorism, and is considered as one of the most important element in the counter-terrorism measures. In the context of counter-terrorism, the Republic of Latvia has to actively contribute to the activities carried out by NATO and EU in order to reduce and timely prevent terrorism threats directed towards the member states of EU and their population. At the same time, the state security authorities must continue to develop and improve the information exchange with special services of other countries.

**Cooperation of the State, Municipalities, and Judicial Authorities in the Area of Counter-terrorism**

Within the framework of the national counter-terrorism system, the state security authorities and other institutions involved in the counter-terrorism measures must ensure more efficient cooperation in order to provide a timely information exchange in regard to terrorist threats. In the framework of the counter-terrorism measures, a regional cooperation must be established to develop a unified understanding about the counter-terrorism measures and actions that have to be taken in the case of terrorism threats. In addition to cooperation with other institutions, the Security Police (the major coordinator of the counter-terrorism measures) must ensure that the current plans and procedures will be reviewed, as well as they will be executed regarding the specific security situation in the relevant region.

**Security of the Terrorism Risk Objects**

The state security authorities must continue to carry out activities developed for improvement of physical security level of the terrorism risk objects (critical infrastructure and crowded places), as well as, if necessary, must entirely review the critical infrastructure. It is necessary to ensure coordination of development of the documents regulating security measures for the critical infrastructure objects, as well as control of the implementation efficiency.

**4.8. Prevention of Cyber Threats**
Cyber threats continue to grow and are considered to be a significant threat to the national security. Cyber threats have a close connection with political, economic, military, and social events, and the geopolitical situation in general. Cyber threats must be evaluated in the context with other threats caused by other countries, as well as threats that originate due to the involvement of the Republic of Latvia in various international organisations (EU and NATO) and missions. Cyber threats related to the national security risks are significantly increased because the state administration agencies, society, and economy are more and more dependant on information technology.

During the last few years, the number of countries that have a capacity to carry out cyber intelligence operations, information operations, and destructive measures within the cyberspace (blocking of services, damaging of information technology, damaging of physical infrastructure) has grown. The readiness of several countries, for example, the Russian Federation, to use such methods also increases. A significant threat is caused by the capacity of the Russian Federation to control the data flow and capacity to use the Internet for identifying the public opinion and changing it. The use of cyber measures against another country is a comparatively cheap weapon and in most cases remains anonymous. These measures can be carried out within the own territory and without the risk of being caught, and it is difficult to combat these measures.

Cyber threats can be caused by foreign special services, cyber units working under the armed forces, as well as hacker groups that act in line with directives of national agencies or on their own. Cyber threats can be directed against the governmental and non-governmental sectors, as well as separate persons and businesses.

Cyber threats to security of the cyberspace of the Republic of Latvia are increased due to lack of knowledge in the private and state sectors in regard to necessity to strengthen security of information technology, lack of highly-qualified IT specialists and the fact they leave Latvia to work in other countries, as well as insufficient capacity of the law enforcement agencies to solve cyber crimes and incomplete regulatory framework for sentencing people committing these crimes.

**Priorities of the Republic of Latvia for Prevention of Cyber Threats:**

**Effective Implementation of the Cyber Security Policy**

Control and reduction of cyber threats can be achieved only if there is an effective cyber security policy in place, that can in long-term and systematically ensure necessary measures in
the case of crisis, develop regulatory framework for the information and technology sector, educate society, as well as purposefully work with human resources necessary for the industry. In the recent years, several planning documents for the policy “Cyber Security Strategy for the Republic of Latvia 2014-2018”, as well as an action plan “Information Society Development Guidelines 2014-2020” have been drafted and put into force. Complete implementation of the measures included in the documents is an important precondition for improvement of the cyber security of the state. While improving the national regulatory enactments regulating the information and technology sector, and being involved in the development of international standards, a balance between the individual rights and interests of the national security must be ensured.

Responsible institutions have to provide a regular and timely review of the regulatory framework for the cyber security, including the internal safety instructions of institutions, considering current changes and rapid dynamic of cyber threats.

**Strengthening of Response and Identification Capacity of Threats**

Identification and understanding of the significance of cyber threats are important factors both on the level of society and the state. The society must understand the risks that could stem from inconsiderate, incorrect or superficial actions in the cyberspace. At the same time, the capacity of institutions involved in the timely identification and effective and quick prevention of cyber threats must be strengthen. These institutions have to work on development of methods and tools by applying them to the current threat situation in the cyberspace, as well as they have to work on reduction of the response time.

State security authorities have to strengthen the capacity for monitoring user-generated content in order to identify and prevent activities purposefully directed against the Republic of Latvia.

**Strengthening of the Security of Information Infrastructure**

State security authorities in cooperation with the Information Technology Security Incident Response Institution of the Republic of Latvia (CERT.LV) must continue working on improvement of the critical information infrastructure procedures, timely risk identification, training for the holders of the critical information infrastructure and security personnel, as well as they have to implement systematic control of the security regime within objects of the infrastructure. They must work on inclusion of objects of the private critical information
infrastructure into the object list of the critical information infrastructure; at the same time, providing holders with additional objectives regarding benefits of entrepreneurship.

It is important that CERT.LV establishes a cooperation with the Internet service providers that are not the holders of the critical infrastructure. Mutual trust and common understanding about the necessity to increase the security level of all the Internet communications and infrastructures of the service providers must be developed.

Institutions responsible for the cyber security must systematically and regularly organise intrusion tests, training and information exchange between all parties involved in order to increase the level of security not only in separate objects, but also in the information technology sector in general.

**Strengthening of the Interinstitutional and International Cooperation**

Institutions responsible for prevention of cyber threats must develop a close mutual and international cooperation. At the same time, these institutions have to strengthen cooperation with the private sector by establishing mutual understanding and assistance system for strengthening the cyber security in general and in the case of a cyber threat. Regular national level cyber security training is necessary to strengthen the response capacity and mutual cooperation, as well as increase understanding about the significance of cyber threats.

Cyber threats do not recognise borders. These threats can be simultaneously directed towards not only the national security interests of the Republic of Latvia, but also towards NATO, EU, and international partners of Latvia. The international cooperation is a precondition for identification of serious cyber incidents, and this cooperation should be especially developed regarding partners from the Baltic states and Northern countries.

The involvement of the Republic of Latvia in various international training operations and cyber attack simulations must be continued and the cooperation procedures with NATO have to be strengthen.

**5. Conclusion**

The security environment in the world has changed and become unpredictable. The number of sources for new threats has grown, and the identification and planning of countermeasures create
more and more new challenges.

Changes of the security environment and increase of threats can be felt throughout all the Euro-Atlantic area and Latvia is a part of this area. Some of these threats directly affect the national security of the Republic of Latvia.

The Republic of Latvia is a member state of EU and NATO. Irrespective of financial support and investments provided by EU and safety guarantees of NATO, the Republic of Latvia has a number of priorities in the national security sector and these priorities must be dealt with independently – the most important of them being the internal security.

Identification, prevention and overcoming of threats to the national security will be successful if the whole state administration is involved; if so, the society will understand these efforts and take part in the activities.

The national security priorities for the prevention of security threats included in the Concept will be used while planing and defining specific measures and instruments for neutralisation and prevention of national security threats that will be included in the Nationals Security Plan.