THE STATE DEFENCE CONCEPT
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INTRODUCTION

State Defence Concept is based on Military Threat Analysis. It defines the strategic framework, priorities and peacetime, military conflict and wartime national-level military defence responsibilities. State Defence planning is coherent with military defence plans and political safeguards of collective defence provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). According to National Security Law, State Defence Plan must be aligned with Military Threat Analysis and framework laid out in the State Defence Concept.

State defence concerns every citizen of Latvia. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the government, public authorities and every resident of Latvia. If we all take our and our country’s security seriously, we as a society will become better prepared for any potential crisis or other contingency. People need to constantly be aware of current security challenges and how they can contribute to state defence efforts.

The new State Defence Concept is released at a time when our society continues to feel the pressures of volatile international security situation and different kinds of non-military threats, such as cybersecurity threats, disinformation and hostile propaganda, socio-economic challenges of the pandemic, natural calamities and other contingencies that have significant impact on public safety, health and well-being, as well as the overall stability in the country. As government tackles all of the above concerns, it must ensure military vigilance and combat readiness of its army. It must also continue to implement a comprehensive armed forces capability development programme. Current regional security context requires Latvia to continue its consistent and pragmatic steps towards stronger state defence, which will allow us to withstand external pressure and achieve faster post-crisis recovery.
1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1.1. Global trends

Rules-based international order, which emerged after the World War II and became universally accepted after the Cold War, is going through changes. Although conventions and international treaties are still in force and legally binding, and security institutions and instruments still work, some countries choose to blatantly ignore international obligations and sovereignty, territorial integrity of other states.

Current trends affecting the international order are driven by politics of force and rivalry, which creates even further uncertainty about international security in future. Diversity of security challenges, including technological developments, terrorism, climate change and pandemic, is a serious concern for global security in a polycentric world.

Global networks are fragmented and we see increasing attempts to act unilaterally, to use blunt force to resolve disputes, in cases when multilateral dialogue should be set up. If ignored, such policies may escalate the risk of aggression and conflicts. Given the geopolitical environment around Latvia, the importance of strengthening national defence capabilities and closer cooperation with NATO will only increase under such scenario.

Military presence of allied NATO countries in the region and their direct support is an important factor in Latvia’s security. On the other hand, different dynamics between allies may also influence our national security. The United States of America (USA) has changed its political stance on how to maintain global order. Its expectations to see other partners making equal contribution to collective defence are reasonable. Although European countries have made notable progress in recent years, insufficient military spending still hampers their ability to adequately respond to military threats in Europe and other regions of the world. European countries still rely heavily on the US military resources both in collective defence and international missions.

Fourth industrial revolution has given us new technologies that will have a profound effect on state defence and social structure. New technologies, more powerful social media and our increasing dependence on gadgets is already affecting the way we consume information, exposing new vulnerabilities and giving rise to new ways to manipulate us. Such processes pose greater danger for democracies, while authoritarian regimes with their firm grip on social media and internet, as well as use of new technologies to control and persecute their people, will find that welcoming.

Terrorist groups and organisations continue to interfere with domestic policies and internatio-
nal affairs. Terrorist attacks in Europe, Middle East, Afghanistan, Northern Africa and Sahel region have intensified. The risk of terrorist organisations capitalising on the financial and political weaknesses of underdeveloped countries and imposing alternative, non-conventional forms of government has increased.

Private military and security companies are deeply embedded in on-going military conflicts. De facto use of private military and security companies for achieving national interests, while denying any involvement with mercenaries, has become a pattern for some countries. These private entities are used as a tool for accessing services such as logistics, reconnaissance, military protection and training, which have traditionally been provided by government players. As private military and security companies acquire a greater role in future international interventions, the security risks associated with them increase and likelihood of them meddling within sovereign states’ internal affairs becomes more and more real.

Global climate changes are already making some regions of the world uninhabitable, which leads to new conflicts and movement of people. New migration patterns have a direct and indirect impact on Europe’s security, as well. Pandemics, industrial accidents and natural disasters may have severe effects on Latvia and other socially and technologically highly developed allies. This could in turn affect the security situation in unexpected ways.

COVID19 pandemic clearly exposed the weaknesses of globalisation and global economic risks. Concentration of production of critical goods in particular countries may cause serious problems with regard to security of supply and shortage of critical goods on the market during a crisis. We can also see that some countries will stop at nothing to fulfil their geopolitical ambitions, including making use of the pandemic.

Global trends show that the balance of power has shifted and it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain peace and stability with diplomatic and economic means. Allies in Europe and North America, and their military and technological advancements, are being challenged by other centres of power that are looking to extend their domination on international arena. Allied nations need to remain united and committed to collective defence, continue to build their own national defence capabilities, demonstrate solidarity and keep credible deterrence and defence posture.

1. 2. Regional trends

Security situation in the Baltic Sea region has been influenced by Russia’s provocative and aggressive military and hybrid activities for a while. But it has become considerably worse since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in
2014. Russia interferes in elections, political and social processes of other countries. It uses information warfare and cyber-attacks. Crackdown on Russian dissidents intensifies. Russia continues to rattle its weapons in a behaviour considered to be a relic since the end of the Cold War up until recently. Russia is following a clear pattern: as long as there is no punishment or retribution, anything goes.

Aggression against Ukraine and attempts to limit the sovereignty of Belarus clearly show that Russia’s appetite is growing. Attempts to change the geopolitical landscape of Europe will only intensify. Use of military power cannot be ruled out either. The favourite narrative of the Kremlin about Russia being ‘the last standing fortress’ surrounded by enemies is still popular among its people who are content with harsh socio-economic realities of their life and consider aggression against neighbouring counties acceptable.

Russian state-controlled media continue to purposefully paint a negative image of Latvia as a country where Nazi ideas are widely supported and Russians are hated. As a result, according to opinion polls conducted in Russia, many Russians consider Latvia one of its main long-time enemies. Russia is likely to continue to portray Latvia as a hostile country and also a failed state. That is how Russia justifies its confrontational policy and tries to hide from its own population the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union Baltic countries have developed more successfully.

In recent years Russia has made huge investments into development of its military capabilities pointed at the West, one of its strategic directions. New military units are formed, weapons modernised, and military formations stationed in the Kaliningrad region are being reinforced. The main focus of Russia’s military training and capability development projects is mobility of its forces, high readiness forces and blocking of access to the Baltic Sea by water and air. Realistically, Russia cannot afford a full scale global-level conventional war with NATO. That is why Russia focuses on more realistic scenarios like hybrid warfare and sudden attack that would give it an advantage of surprise, allowing it to capture territories easier, just like in the case of Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has also clearly indicated and even threatened that it might use nuclear weapons if necessary.

As Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine, it also proceeds with its efforts to divide the members of NATO and the European Union (EU). Russia actively seeks allies amongst member states who would help it apply the necessary political pressure to either fully or partly lift the sanctions imposed against it. Solidarity and unity among the member states of NATO and the EU will be crucial in showing Russia that any attempts to drive a wedge be-
tween them will not succeed and active dialogue is the best way forward.

Introduction of different deterrence measures in the Baltic region since 2014, including development of national capabilities and deployment of NATO forces, has allowed to reduce security threats in the region. National security and defence of the Baltic countries will depend on their ability to upgrade national capabilities and benefit from NATO’s collective defence.

2. **STRATEGIC STATE DEFENCE OBJECTIVES**

2. 1. **Primary state defence objective**

Latvian people and the state are constantly influenced by geopolitical developments around the world and in Europe. Our nation has had to face existential threats numerous times in the past and we have successfully overcome them. That is why state defence is the very cornerstone of continuity of the Latvian State and nation.

The objective of the state defence system is to prevent and eliminate potential threats to national security, assure national sovereignty, ensure that government and its departments can operate and provide continuity, protect the people and make sure every citizen of Latvia feels responsible for the state and its security.

2. 2. **State defence strategy**

The objective of the State defence strategy is to make sure Latvia has a robust defence system, which allows to maximise any potential damages to an aggressor while minimising its gains, and thus deter any potential attack.

National Armed Forces will always protect Latvia against any military attack, irrespective of the size of the aggressor’s army. It will not stand down and will try to create as much damage to the potential aggressor as possible. Moreover, one of the pillars of Latvia’s state defence is NATO’s collective defence provisions. At the same time, population of Latvia must clearly understand that nobody is going to protect Latvia but the people of Latvia themselves and they need to be ready to stand up for their country.

Considering the development of modern technologies and more intricate ways of influencing public attitudes, including the use of online and big data tools, the deterrence is no longer about military preparedness only. Deterrence depends on people’s will to defend their country and prepare for any potential emergency well in advance. Peacetime psychological resilience of the society is becoming increasingly important in countering external influence and ensuring deterrence.

Comprehensive defence is the best tool for
achieving societal resilience. Comprehensive
defence not only makes us more prepared for
peacetime and wartime crisis, it also reduces
distrust between people and the government
and contributes to a more cohesive society
overall.

Here are the four pillars of state defence:

- **NATIONAL ARMED FORCES.** Mission
  of the National Armed Forces is to ensure
  the continuity of the state, make sure gover-
nment is operational and army can quickly
  respond to sudden attacks, quickly detect
  any covert aggression, identify, assess and
  eliminate any potential threat. In case of
  large-scale military aggression, National
  Armed Forces have to use their assets to
  weaken the enemy and prevent it from ma-
  king any progress, as well as cause maxi-
  mum damage possible to the aggressor. In
  case of full or partial temporary occupation
  of Latvia, National Armed Forces must help
  people join the resistance.

- **COMPREHENSIVE DEFENCE.** Objective
  of comprehensive defence is to make
  sure public authorities, non-governmen-
tal actors and citizens are ready to defend
  their state, help National Armed Forces,
  maintain vital functions of the society and
  economy and engage in civil defence in a
time of war. Societal resilience is rooted in
psychological resilience against external
factors. It also involves advance individual
level preparedness for a potential crisis or
war by disseminating instructions on how
to act and what to do in case of crisis or war.

- **NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE.** Main
  elements of NATO’s collective defence,
  which deter potential aggressors from at-
tacking Latvia, are unity of NATO member
  states, presence of allied troops in Latvia
  and credibility of the Article 5 of the North
  Atlantic Treaty.

- **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.** Closer
  bilateral military cooperation pri-
marily with the US, Canada, the Baltic Sea
region countries and largest allies in Europe
is key to credible deterrence and adequa-
te national-level preparedness for external
aggression. European Union should play a
greater role in shaping security policy and
build closer ties with NATO. Cooperation
should lead to smoother exchange of infor-
mation, regional defence partnerships, joint
participation in international missions and
post-aggression support to partner countries
like Georgia and Ukraine.

3. **STATE DEFENCE FRAMEWORK**

3.1. **National Armed Forces**

National Armed Forces (NAF) are the backbo-
ne of the state defence system. Development
of NAF is centred around efficient defence aga-
inst different kinds of attacks. Defence system
must be capable of detecting potential threats early on.

In order to successfully defend Latvia, National Armed Forces must make full use of Latvia’s unique terrain, stopping any advances of the enemy, inflicting maximum damage to its personnel and equipment, disabling and destroying the command, control and supply chains, and ensuring host nation support for allied forces.

The main operational component of the National Armed Forces consists of Regular Force, National Guard and National Armed Forces Reserve. Here are the key goals of National Armed Forces development:

- mobility
- highly decentralised command, control and supply systems
- highest survivability standards
- interoperability
- high firepower
- resilience against electronic warfare
- efficient management and maintenance of military assets
- highest technological standards

If defence spending remains at its current level, army will be able to develop only its core functions. Development of capabilities such as medium-range air and missile defence, active defence at sea and longrange indirect fire support remain long-term goals. Latvia is therefore forced to rely on its allies for missing capabilities, including financial support required to fill capability gaps.

3. 1. 1. Conventional defence

3. 1. 1. 1. Early warning system

Considering the military upgrades implemented by Russia, mainly focusing on high readiness and mobility units, Latvia needs to upgrade its national early warning system to minimise the risks of a sudden attack and provide decision makers with most accurate and timely data.

Data collection, analysis and dissemination for timely decision-making is the responsibility of state security services and NAF. Early warning system must integrate State Border Guard systems and external border infrastructure management systems. Efficient early warning system must:

- alert on any changes
- provide decision-makers with instant updates
- simulate potential response scenarios.

3. 1. 1. 2. Command, control and communication systems

Battlefield situational awareness and quick,
efficient communication among strategic, operational and tactical levels are major pre-conditions for successful defence operations. Command, control and communication systems have to be able to operate in various conditions, including environments where signals are being supressed, GPS may not be tracked and other weapons of electronic warfare are used. Command and control system must also provide secure communications, prevent data interception and other types of attempted manipulation.

3.1.1.3. Rapid response

Rapid response is one of the key capabilities of National Armed Forces and National Guard, and in time of war also State Border Guard and the Central Bank. To be able to efficiently defend itself, Latvia needs to maintain a certain number of highly prepared rapid response units.

These units are primarily made up of Land Forces Mechanised Infantry Brigade and National Guard brigades. National Guard battalions are required to maintain company-size high readiness units with all necessary support elements, such as indirect fire support, anti-armour capability, air defence capability. National Armed Forces as well as the responsible state security services and law enforcement services need to be able to respond to any threat immediately. They must also be capable of responding to a direct attack. Enhanced response of Vidzeme and Latgale National Guard brigades can be achieved through closer integration of these units with professional army units.

3.1.1.4. Integration of State Border Guard and Central Bank’s Security Department

State Border Guard and Central Bank’s Security Department are required to join NAF in case of a military attack as a primary reinforcement. Closer integration and improved compatibility of State Border Guard and Central Bank’s Security Department with NAF will enhance the ability of these units to contribute to state defence. NATO certification and basic military training is the most appropriate way of ensuring that these units meet the applicable defence capability standards.

State Border Guard must ensure appropriate number and size of units that can cover the whole length of the external border of Latvia.

3.1.1.5. Combat readiness

High standards of combat readiness require NAF to organise regular training at various levels. NAF must organise NAMEJS, a comprehensive military exercise for its personnel and staff of other government agencies responsible for state defence and security, at least once every four years. Training must be as realistic
and close to actual combat as possible. For this purpose more exercises must be organised outside military training grounds allowing each unit to practice within their designated area.

NAF wartime units must be activated, conducting full personnel training and mobilisation of infrastructure and assets, including private sector and civil defence systems. Latvia must also continue to host joint Baltic exercises, coordinate training with NATO military formations, work on force coordination and seamless collaboration in a single operational framework.

Regular snap combat readiness drills must be organised for testing unit training, preparedness, combat readiness and capability levels. These drills should give a better understanding of unit response plans, readiness of military personnel to respond to national level threats and readiness of units to get fully operational and engage in military operations at short notice.

Strategic-level exercise KRISTAPS must be conducted at least every 12 months to test the emergency management plans, crisis and wartime response plans of the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries and other governmental institutions.

3. 1. 1. 6. Defence decentralisation

Decentralisation and operational coordination at unit level is crucial for NAF to be able to effectively resist any aggression throughout the territory of Latvia.

Tactical training of smaller units is therefore instrumental. Unit commanders of all levels, from top to section level, must be capable of taking the leadership and coordinating overall strategic, operational and tactical delivery. Precise information about enemy units and communication among various units is essential in achieving these goals.

According to Article 25 of the National Security Law, unit commanders need to be adequately trained and ready to get engaged in state defence based on State Defence Operational Plan without instructions from the top.

3. 1. 1. 7. Infrastructure

NAF and Latvia as a host country need to develop regional training infrastructure, training areas and firing ranges. Development of different types of warehouse facilities is also a priority.

Gradual development of National Guard battalion infrastructure shall improve decentralised operations and supply. Further standardisation of military facilities and infrastructure is important for the efficient development and convenient maintenance of these assets. Wider use of environmentally friendly wooden materials suitable for Latvia’s climatic conditions should
also be encouraged.

3. 1. 1. 8. Counter-mobility

Development of counter-mobility systems is a peacetime activity, which involves finding the right cooperation partners, proactive infrastructure adjustments, identification of human resource and training needs and delivery of specific military exercise. NAF should continue to enhance its counter-mobility cooperation with private sector, conduct regular counter-mobility execution operations, including mobilisation of required resources, during regular military training.

NAF should build a system that allows constructing reinforcing obstacles in early stages of conflict or even peacetime. In case of a military conflict, defence minister may decide to remove specific civil infrastructure and substitute it with necessary operational counter-mobility solutions.

3. 1. 1. 9. Peacetime and wartime logistics management

Centralised procurement system for NAF, National Guard and Cadet Force is managed on day to day basis by professional competence centre, a civilian agency which is gradually consolidating defence procurements, operates the single asset inventory, distribution and quality control system. It also promotes unified standards and enhances technical and supply management competences.

One of the key priorities of NAF with regard to logistics is development of combat, logistics, supply and maintenance units.

3. 1. 1. 10. Host nation support

It is the responsibility of Latvia as the host nation to provide other allies with support during peacetime and early stages of a crisis. Host nation support includes access to vital resources, infrastructure, locations, and in case of military conflict also priority access to national airports, ports and motorways. In peacetime bureaucratic hurdles need to be minimised to ensure free movement of allied forces across NATO and EU. EU-level decisions must be made. Infrastructure must also be adapted for military mobility.

In terms of host nation support priorities, Latvia needs to continue focusing on development of Liepāja Port and Lielvārde airfield. New infrastructure projects, for example, Rail Baltic need to be suitable for military needs. This includes construction of railway link to Camp Ādaži. Military mobility parameters agreed by NATO and EU countries need to be followed when building or repairing roads and bridges.

Government institutions responsible for host nation support planning and delivery need to
build their own asset reserves, infrastructure, sector-specific expertise and analytical capacity that meet support standards and obligations stipulated in relevant legal acts.

3. 1. 1. 11. Cooperation with civilian sector

A deeper permanent cooperation with civilian sector is key in ensuring functions of NAF and basic needs of the society during wartime.

NAF must strengthen its medical capabilities and cooperation with Latvian universities on integration of military medicine in university curriculum. NAF must also cooperate with healthcare sector on crisis management training and scenario-based response planning for potential aggression.

Integration of State Border Guard, Central Bank’s Security Department, Information Technology Security Incident Response Institution, Latvian Environment, Geology and Meteorology Centre, A/S ‘Latvijas Gaisa satiksme’ and Civil Aviation Agency with NAF must be tested on regular basis. Stakeholders must also take part in planning and military exercises.

Civil protection system is part of the state defence framework. It is fundamental for efficient and comprehensive defence, as it ensures the coordination between civilian and military sectors, resource coordination and harmonisation of capabilities. Implementation of NATO’s basic standards in civilian sector is crucial in ensuring critical services to people and civilian support during military operations. Civil protection system must be able to provide basic needs of the population during peacetime, wartime, military attack or threats.

Civilian protection operational command centre is responsible for the functioning of civil protection system during war, military attack or danger. Its procedures and analytical capacity must be improved and regularly tested during crisis management exercises. Civilian protection operational command centre must work together with NAF, as well as government institutions, companies and local civil defence commissions.

Exchange of information between all stakeholders responsible for crisis management is absolutely crucial for reaching common goals of civil-military cooperation. To ensure the efficient coordination of crisis response, civil and military communication networks must be secure and protected against any attempts to disrupt them.

3. 1. 2. Protection against hybrid threats

The level of hybrid threats in Latvia is constantly high. It is important to strengthen resilience of the society and boost capabilities required
to respond to such threats on daily basis and in case of aggression.

Considering the rather limitless opportunities to execute influence operations and the wide range of technologies for social engineering, society must be ready to cope with new types of security challenges. NAF, national security community and other responsible authorities need to upgrade the capacity to identify, record and expose hybrid threats targeting Latvia.

Efficient functioning, cooperation and speed of reaction of government bodies are crucial for defending the state against hybrid threats. Crisis management procedures and awareness of responsible officials need to be regularly upgraded to make sure that top government officials can take decisions quickly and based on the right information that allows them to either contain threats or eliminate them entirely.

3. 1. 3. Resistance

It is the duty of every citizen to defend their country and show either active or passive resistance to aggressor. In case of sudden military attack each unit of NAF and every civilian institution know exactly what they need to do according to State Defence Plan. They do not need to be told when to start defending Latvia.

NAF and government authorities will continue to defend Latvia even if control over part of the country’s territory is lost during a war. They will continue to resist the aggressor until a point where territorial sovereignty of Latvia is fully restored. National Security Law specifies precise responsibilities of NAF in case of war or military attack. It also stipulates people’s rights and obligations in time of war or military attack.

NAF must plan and prepare for resistance proactively. Civilian population is engaged in counter-mobility and resistance operations on voluntary and mutual trust basis. This can be achieved through peacetime education of population and setting up coordination frameworks and adequate support infrastructure.

3. 2. Comprehensive defence system

Country may be lost without a fight if people are not ready to defend themselves. Public awareness, resilience against manipulation attempts, practical knowledge on how to overcome crisis and civic participation are fundamental for stability and safety of the society. Sustainable development of Latvia is impossible without state defence and societal resilience.

Knowledge and decisive action at an individual level are key for crisis preparedness, management and recovery. Comprehensive defence requires culture of preparedness. Society needs to put effort into getting themselves ready for possible worst-case scenarios. People need
to support each other in their private and social circle to give each other more reassurance and build the necessary level of psychological resilience. Strengthening of National Guard and Cadet Force is essential because these organisations provide all citizens with possibility to prepare for potential threats while continuing to live a civil life.

Comprehensive defence serves a twofold purpose of building peacetime societal resilience and ensuring state defence during war. Here are the main crisis and wartime priorities of comprehensive defence system:

1) public support for National Armed Forces in ensuring state defence:

• participation in National Armed Forces and armed resistance
• host nation support to allied forces
• counter-mobility operations
• all kinds of support to NAF and allies (for example, to facilitate information exchange, supply and other functions/activities)
• resistance movement and support, passive resistance (for example, refusal to collaborate with aggressor’s army, civil disobedience)

2) capacity of society and economy to deliver critical services and manage all kinds of contingencies, including military conflict:

• government functioning, efficient response and continuity
• clear wartime tasks and responsibilities of each institution and local government, precisely defined critical human resources and functions
• undisrupted access to critical services (for example, electricity, communications, financial services, food, critical infrastructure and personnel safety) at all times
• proactive supply and accumulation of raw materials and other resources for critical services
• timely preparedness for crisis or war across all levels of society, including individual level of every citizen.

3. 2. 1. Continuity of government

Continuous delivery of core government functions during a potential crisis or war requires preliminary work on relevant protocols across all levels of institutional framework, including the office of the president, parliament, Cabinet of Ministers and other government and local institutions. It also requires national security community continuity, as well as capacity to tackle tasks critical for functioning of the society.

Considering how dependent government institutions and society have become on technologies and access to data, security of information
systems plays a significant role in government continuity during a crisis or war.

Finally, each public body should have well-defined responsibilities and role in the context of state defence. Core functions need to be clearly identified, ensuring their continuity at all times.

3. 2. 2. Societal resilience

Public involvement is indispensable to comprehensive defence. Civic engagement of Latvian population is crucial. People need to take greater responsibility for what is happening in the country. This includes national defence.

Latvia needs to promote the culture of preparedness. Each non-governmental organisation, private company and government institution needs to accept its responsibility for ensuring readiness to any potential crisis. Societal resilience plays a major part in building this culture. It involves timely education and preparedness for wartime response, including people’s ability to survive and take care of themselves for as long as possible or at least for the initial 72 hours. Dissemination of information and training on the best courses of action in case of threats must be stepped up. In addition, regular workshops, training and presentations to various groups of the society need to be rolled out. Latvia must offer hands on training to all groups and communities in our society.

Every individual’s knowledge and skills can be crucial in supporting state defence. All kinds of assets and resources can make a difference. Psychological support to the victims and families of essential workers on the front line of crisis management and mitigation can be essential.

3. 2. 3. Information space security

Government must use different available resources to ensure that information space is protected. Every citizen of Latvia must be aware that individual and general protection against influence operations and information space attacks is a continuous process.

Media literacy training of the society must be continued through school and university curriculum and targeted training designed for various social groups. It is also important to continue communicating with various groups of the society to make them fully aware of the current information space challenges and threats, and thus promote critical thinking and psychological resilience against influence operations.

In addition, defence sector must create an integrated strategic communication platform based on various communication channels. In case of military threat to our country, strategic communication platform and various other activities in the information space would contribute to more efficient response of Latvia to
information warfare and psychological operations which are an integral part of any conflict.

Latvia must promote strong awareness across all levels about the harms of foreign influence operations. Government must prepare a toolkit for countering all kinds of influence operations against Latvia. This kind of preparedness would give potential aggressor a clear strategic signal that Latvia will have zero tolerance against influence operations both in times of peace and war.

3. 2. 4. Economic resilience

Every business in Latvia has a role in state defence. However, businesses, products and services of which are critical for state defence during a crisis, are particularly valuable. Providers of these services must continue operating despite crisis or war. They must provide continuous functioning of national economy and keep the supply of necessary products and services running. Consequently, security of supply and economic and technological dependence on countries that do not belong to NATO or the EU is a serious business consideration for these companies.

Government must build a state emergency reserves system that meets the above requirements. The system would be triggered upon early indications of potential threat and utilise options contracts. It would also restrict exports of food, medicines and strategic raw materials. By delegating mobility responsibilities to trusted business operators during peacetime, Latvia can create an efficient framework for structured private sector contribution to state defence. Government institutions must identify the needs and create state emergency reserves system. This would enhance economic resilience and ensure that government can continue providing vital services and functions despite the crisis.

In peacetime business owners can help strengthen state defence by encouraging their employees to join National Guard and National Armed Forces Reserve and create National Guard units in their companies, which also contributes to better physical security of their assets during a potential crisis.

3. 2. 5. Non-governmental sector

All citizens can contribute to national policies. Voting is not the only way to influence national policies as a citizen. In democracy citizens must self-organise to be able to promote their agenda, help improve everyday life and efficiency of government institutions. Constant self-organising is crucial in today’s complex communicative and manipulative environment. Only by helping each other will people be able to better understand what is happening outside
their social circle and distinguish between what is important and what is not when a crisis comes.

Mutual trust between people and confidence in government is absolutely vital for state security and development. In case of crisis, trust towards one another and the government can be decisive in country’s ability to consolidate around efforts to overcome crisis.

Non-governmental organisations play an important part in providing this link. NGOs need to be involved in defence planning and delivery of theoretical and practical training. Government, on the other hand, must clearly define the role and responsibilities of NGOs in delivering functions and tasks delegated to them.

And, last but not least, in peacetime NGOs must contribute to educating society and providing necessary skills. Social partners should also raise public awareness about crisis response. In case of emergency, NGOs should be able to help people and disseminate verified information by also engaging Latvian diaspora abroad for these purposes.

### 3. 2. 6. Church

Church plays a major role in strengthening psychological resilience of religious groups of population during a crisis or war. Church may help religious groups cope better with shocks and motivate them to help others around them. Another important way in which religious organisations can help Latvia in case of crisis or war is to help spread credible information, help victims and provide solace to those affected or touched by the crisis, especially wartime tragedies.

### 3. 2. 7. Civil resistance

In cases when aggressor’s force temporarily takes over control of a part of our country’s territory, and Latvia is under a real threat, civilian population must retreat to the parts of the country still controlled by National Armed Forces and allied troops if possible.

Citizens have the duty to decline collaboration with illegitimately appointed government officials and institutions, occupying power or aggressor’s army, and continue passive resistance. This can be achieved by distancing oneself from decisions and actions of occupying power, avoiding mass events organised by occupying power, non-disclosure of information and boycotting of illegal elections, referendums or popular votes held by enemy government.

Covert support of people is decisive for the success of the resistance movement. People can help by, for example, offering resources, medical help and supplies, information, financial, communications, training, recruitment, recon-
naissance and other assistance to members of the civil resistance movement, armed resistance, NAF and allied troops. There are different ways in which every citizen of Latvia can contribute to the resistance movement. In the meantime, citizens also have to take into account the associated security risks.

3. 2. 8. Cyber security

One of the integral elements of comprehensive defence is cyber security and IT resilience. Greater focus on cyber security training (cyber hygiene) and sticking to minimum security standards can help reduce risks (vulnerabilities) to government institutions, society and businesses, and ensure continuous operations. It is also advisable to keep reducing dependence on technologies produced by countries with aggressive cyberspace strategies against NATO, the European Union or their member states.

With introduction of fifth generation mobile networks (5G) strategic security agenda of many countries is dominated by 5G network security and its technical, technological and political elements.

It also requires people and the society at large to change their habits and reduce digital security risks like storing of personal data on unsafe servers and downloading unverified mobile applications. People must also critically evaluate whether it is appropriate to allow open use of their personal data on various platforms.

Cyber security should be a part of education curriculum. It should be one of the topics in state defence lessons. It should also be integrated in annual training of government and local institutions. There is also a need to create a network of regional units of Cyber Cadet Force and National Guard Cyber Security Unit.

Protection of information and cyber space in time of crisis or war should rely on active and passive defence to prevent any attempts to apply external pressure on the population and to disable people.

In case of military threat, it is important to ensure continuous exchange of data and access to critical services

3. 2. 9. Youth education

Youth education and training is crucial in shaping tomorrow’s society of Latvia. Quality of their education will determine the future resilience of the Latvian society against external factors, constantly increasing technological pressures and vulnerabilities associated with the use of technologies.

That is why it is so important to integrate Cadet Force and state defence lessons into schools and their curriculum. It will help reach the
above goals and set up a full scale comprehensive defence system. Meaningful youth state defence education, patriotic upbringing, civic awareness, cohesion, leadership and physical training will significantly enhance international competitiveness of Latvia in the future.

Schools across Latvia are currently switching to skills-based learning, which means that greater attention can now be given to young people’s leadership qualities that are essential for development of Cadet Force and the comprehensive defence system. Cadet Force will continue to provide voluntary military training for youth until full introduction of state defence lessons in national school setting. Informal Cadet Force education is available to children and youngsters aged 10 to 21 but the main target group still is Year 5-9 pupils, altogether 8,000 children in different parts of Latvia.

Currently state defence is an elective course available to upper secondary (Year 10-11) pupils. It teaches young people core state defence skills, how to act in times of crisis, critical thinking and civic patriotism. State defence training also gives the essential knowledge, skills and mindset to deal with crisis. State defence themes should be integrated in other general education courses and also university curricula, too.

Youngsters attending state defence lessons are eligible to apply for voluntary state defence summer camps. At these camps young people can enhance the training they have received in classroom setting throughout the academic year in a real environment and boost their overall physical condition without any risk to their health. State defence lessons will become part of mandatory training in all Latvian secondary schools from 2024/2025 academic year. Every year around 30,000 young people aged 15-17 will be taught.

At least 2,000 young people should participate in voluntary summer camps each year to ensure that Latvia has a growing share of population with military training. This training is a step towards professional army for those who want to join armed forces and should also encourage youngsters to explore opportunities provided by National Guard, army reserve and other public jobs. Even if graduates of summer camps decide not to continue their military career in active service, they will join the army reserve and can be mobilised when necessary because they will have the necessary resilience and know how to respond to a crisis. In case of crisis they will represent the most active, mobile, knowledgeable and skilful part of the society and will be able to defend themselves and others.

State defence lessons are a modern way of teaching youngsters about current security challenges. This course is designed for much broader target group compared to mandatory
military service (conscription), which targets only a certain part of the society, traditionally particularly male. Introduction of state defence lessons shall rapidly increase the number of citizens with state defence skills. It is expected that in 10 years’ time almost third of Latvia’s population could be trained this way.

Ministry of Defence is planning to create its own vocational secondary education establishment. On top of general education curriculum, this establishment will provide its pupils skills and values that will contribute to their intellectual and leadership qualities, high sense of responsibility and other skills necessary for enhanced physical and mental endurance. This is how Ministry plans to train future military commanders and promote leadership among Latvian army officers. Vocational secondary education establishment, which will offer general education curriculum, will focus on STEM subjects: mathematics, physics, chemistry and technologies. This will allow future officers to master the necessary skills for using modern combat vehicles.

3.3. NATO collective defence

Although Latvia is located in a region dominated by a far more superior military power, Latvia is part of the strongest military alliance in the world, NATO. NATO contributes to stronger deterrence and defence of Latvia. NATO’s collective defence is instrumental in ensuring security of Latvia and peace in Europe at large.

3.3.1. Regional presence

Allied presence in Latvia shows clear commitment of allies to supporting Latvia. It is a powerful deterrence signal to all potential aggressors. Allied presence is strategically important. Permanent presence of NATO forces in Latvia is the objective that should be pursued by all means. Allied forces support NAF units during operations and are strongly integrated in NAF command chain. Allied forces possess all the required capabilities to meet support goals. Presence of allied troops can also be ensured outside formal NATO mechanisms, on basis of bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements between Latvia and respective countries.

Further strengthening of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Latvia is vital in ensuring more efficient support to Latvian units responsible for state defence. It will also enhance the deterrence effect. It is extremely important to enhance allied presence with long-range capabilities such as fire support, air defence and coastal and port defence systems. Allied units deployed to Latvia are the core component of allied presence. Additionally, among factors contributing to deterrence are:

- regular international military exercises hosted in Latvia
• NATO command headquarters located in Latvia, especially the Multinational Division Headquarters North
• armoured vehicles and equipment deployed to Latvia

3. 3. 2. NATO credibility

Attack against one ally is considered an attack on all allies. That is the principle, which underpins Alliance’s deterrence policy. Here are the main elements of NATO’s credibility:

• readiness to grant political and military support in case of attack
• military presence of allied forces countries facing the biggest threats
• reinforcement capabilities
• development of national capabilities of member states via investing at least 2% of their GDP in defence
• credible nuclear deterrence policy

Latvia needs to constantly work on the development of these elements to make sure NATO military power is sufficient to guarantee peace and stability in Latvia and our allied countries.

NATO collective defence provides a 360-degree approach to deter threats and guarantee the security and sovereignty of all of its member states.

3. 3. 3. Response readiness

Presence of allied forces does not automatically mean they are ready to respond. NATO must be able to give instant military response to prevent the aggressor from achieving *fait accompli* or making the situation irreversible. NATO should be able to proactively reinforce national defence of member states in case of military tensions to de-escalate a potential conflict. Modern warfare is becoming increasingly rapid. Early warning systems are therefore under great pressure. NATO must be able to respond even when warning is given at last minute or attack is very sudden. Here are the fundamental elements of rapid response:

• proactive deployment of allied troops to countries facing imminent security threats
• well-trained, capable and equipped rapid reaction units
• operational defence plans with clear reinforcement strategies
• efficient political and military leadership
• high military mobility

Latvia must fill gaps in all of these areas. Multinational Division Headquarters North, which is located in Latvia, should become the framework for enhancing coordinated rapid response capabilities of NATO forces in case of a potential crisis.
3. 4. International cooperation

3. 4. 1. Strategic partnership with the United States

US is Latvia’s main strategic partner. US has supported our country throughout history and has helped significantly strengthen our state defence ever since we restored our independence. Latvia highly appreciates the support provided by the US, especially the presence of US troops in Latvia, as well as assistance in developing NAF capabilities and delivering joint training.

Latvia needs to continue the existing close cooperation with US in areas such as regional defence plans, strengthening of military capabilities and regular exchange of information on regional security. Military presence of US troops in Latvia is a crucial element of our deterrence capabilities. Further reinforcement of such presence is the future goal. Another priority is the deployment of US military vehicles, equipment and assets to Latvia and the Baltic region.

Latvia and the US need to continue joint international missions. NAF need to continue joint projects with Michigan National Guard, which has been involved in the NAF development for already three decades now.

3. 4. 2. Baltic cooperation

Estonia and Lithuania have traditionally, politically and geographically been the closest allies of Latvia. Efficient defence cooperation between Baltic countries is an essential element of regional security, stability and threat prevention. Latvia strongly supports comprehensive Baltic-level military cooperation in all available formats and efforts to promote common security and defence policy in different international formats and forums. Mutual trust, coordination of military capability development projects, enhanced compatibility of armed forces and integration of command and control systems is key to successful Baltic cooperation.

3. 4. 3. Canada

Canada is the framework nation of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Latvia. It commands the battle group and is a particularly important ally of Latvia. Latvia needs to continue enhancing its bilateral cooperation with Canada. Latvia is looking forward to joint battle group development projects, including setting up of joint combat support arrangements. Latvia should consider joint NAF international missions with Canadian side and possible civilian cooperation as a way of expanding its successful military cooperation with Canada.
3. 4. 4. The United Kingdom

United Kingdom is one of Latvia’s main allies in Europe. UK has consistently supported strengthening of NATO collective defence and has had a shared understanding of our regional security challenges. UK and Latvia must continue defence cooperation irrespective of how the future relationship between the UK and the European Union will form. Latvia is ready to continue its participation in various military cooperation formats coordinated by the UK, especially the Joint Expeditionary Force led by the UK.

3. 4. 5. Poland

Militarily Poland is one Baltic region’s and Europe’s strongest NATO countries. Poland’s understanding of the European geopolitical situation and its geographical proximity makes Poland a strategic defence policy partner for Latvia in the Baltic Sea Region. Therefore, intensification of bilateral cooperation with Poland, together with deepening of Baltic Sea Region cooperation in all available formats, must be continued.

3. 4. 6. Countries of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Latvia

Canada, Albania, Czech Republic, Iceland, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain belong to the group of countries which form the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Latvia and together make up a serious contribution to Latvia’s deterrence and defence capabilities. Latvia highly values this contribution and shall continue to promote close bilateral ties with these countries in the future, as well. Latvia is committed to support these countries in their future efforts to address various threats and challenges arising in the Southern flank, Arctic and Central Europe.

3. 4. 7. Germany

The role played by Germany in defence and foreign policy areas has significantly increased since UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. Latvia should continue to enhance cooperation with Germany on common approach and action plans for addressing Europe’s strategic and military threats. Germany plays a major role in strengthening Baltic Sea region’s defence and security. Latvia needs politically and militarily strong Germany, which can safeguard peace and stability in Europe. That is why bilateral cooperation with Germany is so important. Latvia is looking forward to enhanced cooperation between military industries and joint military training delivered together with Germany. Regional multilateral cooperation formats are also a good framework for deeper cooperation with Germany.


### 3. 4. 8. France

France has a significant role in shaping European security and defence policy. It also contributes to successful implementation of NATO deterrence policy and Baltic Sea region defence plans. It is important to continue bringing Baltic Sea region defence and successful NATO deterrence policy closer together.

### 3. 4. 9. Nordic countries

Considering geographical proximity, similar threat perception, shared cultural and historical background, cooperation between Baltic and Nordic countries should be much deeper.

Building on Northern Group, Nordic-Baltic and other Baltic Sea region cooperation frameworks, Latvia should enhance political and military cooperation with Scandinavian countries, and thus strengthen regional solidarity.

### 3. 4. 10. Ukraine and Georgia

Latvia will continue supporting Georgian and Ukrainian efforts to negotiate the return of illegally occupied areas by showing solidarity and non-recognition of occupation. Latvia will continue to expand bilateral defence cooperation with these countries and support further Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and Georgia.

### 3. 4. 11. Arms control

Latvia supports peaceful resolution of conflicts between countries, with full respect for international laws. Arms control is an essential tool for achieving that. It provides greater transparency of military capabilities and facilitates stable relations among countries.

However, arms control mechanisms have started eroding in the past 10 years. There is less and less transparency and predictability. Existing treaties are being ignored or even violated. Latvia must contribute to greater awareness among allies about the importance of ensuring that all parties fulfil their liabilities. That is the only way to ensure efficient arms control and greater safety.

Latvia and its allies have to be ready to use military means to protect their sovereignty in cases when arms control regimes are violated by other states parties. Arms control merely complements other elements of general defence and deterrence policy of Latvia in the current security environment.

The United Nations and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe are the main multinational bodies working towards reliable arms control to promote more security.
3. 4. 12. NAF role in international military operations and rapid response forces

In order to promote safety in regions surrounding Europe and maximise the impact of international organisations, Latvia will continue to contribute its military resources to international operations and rapid response forces. Participation in international missions and rapid response forces gives NAF troops additional experience and skills. It gives NAF combat units higher level of preparedness and interoperability with allied forces. NAF needs to develop and sustain a capability to contribute one battalion-size unit to any of the peace-keeping operations for at least two rotation periods in order to be capable to contribute in international security efforts more effectively.

Participation in these operations depends on current operational needs of Latvian defence sector.

3. 5. European Union

Latvia believes that the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (EU) must remain a member state competence, subject to unanimous consent. Latvia is ready to continue contributing to the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU and participate in EU military missions and operations carried out in regions that have direct impact on security of EU member states. Balanced and efficient regional support to partner countries, including Eastern Partnership countries, and their armed forces through European Peace Facility is the best way to secure peace and stability in Europe’s neighbouring regions.

Latvia supports EU defence initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation and European Defence Fund, which contribute to safer Europe. Enhanced military mobility in Europe, greater competitiveness and mutual cooperation within EU’s defence industry is crucial for ensuring level playing field and harmonised standards for defence industry development across the Union.

NATO is the only collective defence framework Latvia is part of, and EU defence cooperation initiatives can have a complementary effect on NATO efforts if duplication is avoided. NATO and EU must work closely on issues such as crisis management, defence against non-conventional threats, countering of disinformation and consistent strategic communication.

Latvia will continue to advocate cooperation with third countries that are members of NATO but do not belong to the EU. Such a cooperation is crucial and these countries must be offered to join EU defence projects whenever possible.
3. 6. State defence assets

3. 6. 1. Budget

Adequate defence funding is an important prerequisite for reaching appropriate level of state defence capabilities. Sufficient defence funding demonstrates our commitment to international obligations. It is also a strong signal of political will to ensure adequate state defence.

In 2014, during the Wales Summit, NATO member states agreed to meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence and keep the funding at the same level in future. To meet the NATO target, Latvia has set a defence spending threshold of 2% of GDP in its Law on the Financing of National Defence.

According to NATO guideline, defence funding can only be spent on defence needs. Funding of other needs that are not related to state defence is not considered defence spending.

In the duration period of the Concept, Latvia must ensure a balanced defence budget that has the following breakdown between budget lines: personnel and administrative costs (50%), maintenance costs (30%) and investments (at least 20%).

3. 6. 2. Personnel

NAF must continue to increase its personnel size taking into account the constraints of the national labour market. By recruiting additional defence personnel, Latvia significantly increases the costs of potential aggressor’s attack.

In the duration period of the Concept, professional army of Latvia must reach the size of 8,000 troops to fill all the vacancies in NAF units and support the expected capability development outcomes. NAF will continue to acquire new capabilities and equipment in the coming years and well-educated, trained, highly motivated professional soldiers with various fields of expertise will become the core asset of NAF.

National Guard is indispensable in defending territorial integrity of Latvia. According to the existing plans, the size of the National Guard must grow to 10,000 troops by 2024 and reach 12,000 troops by 2027.

National Guard must continue to recruit young generation of troops to ensure that young people, who have decided to go through full military training and pursue a military career in National Guard, while also leading a civilian life, can contribute to state defence. It is necessary to continue the employer outreach programme to convince them to encourage National Guard troops to participate in military exercises,
perform specific military duties and master the necessary skills.

National Guard must develop training modules and provide distance learning possibilities to be able to attract National Guard members of various backgrounds, including vital support staff, by offering them a possibility to gradually complete training modules and continuously develop their skills and competences through flexible learning plans that fit all individual work and private life arrangements.

It is vital to continue raising public awareness about voluntary participation in state defence to make sure this kind of civic engagement receives the wide support and respect that it deserves. It is absolutely pivotal to change people’s scepticism towards National Guard. Politicians and opinion leaders need to become real role-models of active participation in National Guard. They should also support public campaigns that focus on the prestige of being a member of the National Guard to generate a long-lasting public support for National Guard.

It is also necessary to continue increasing the size of trained reserve personnel, including retired professional service members, non-active duty National Guard, graduates of Level 4 Cadet Force training who have also completed state defence training camp courses, given the reserve oath of enlistment and completed military training for army reserve volunteers. According to the Concept, this should allow training and recruiting about 6,000 new reserve troops.

It is equally important to set up a full reserve training programme based on unit level framework for reserve force engagement and operational readiness, i.e. create a two-level reserve personnel training system with active reserve (unit-level training) and permanent reserve (centrally managed and coordinated framework). In case of full mobilisation, reserve training is provided by the Cadet Force Centre.

Defence sector civilian staff plays an important role in ensuring suitability and constant efficiency of the overall system. Although there is a clear separation between military and civilian service, it is a must for the defence sector civilian personnel to have at least basic military training to be able to deliver vital military functions.

It is also important to identify other critical professions outside defence sector that are vital for continuity of the state and the society in case of military conflict or intervention. These include occupations, service of which during crisis or war is just as important as in peacetime.

3.6.3. Security of supply

Secure supply of assets and resources essential for NAF combat capability assurance is one
of the key priorities. It plays a crucial role in times of crisis when undisrupted, reliable, secure and timely delivery of goods and services may be decisive for efficient state defence.

3. 6. 4. Sectoral-level asset reserves

Resilience and continued operations at the sectoral level are elements of comprehensive defence that are critical for defending Latvia. Availability of critical materials and resources in the initial stages of a crisis is essential in ensuring critical services and preventing national-level threats. Each sector must define a list of essential goods and services crucial for threat response at the sectoral level. Essential reserves and secure supply of materials and resources are fundamental and should be covered by local industries when needed. It is necessary to improve sectoral product compliance assurance systems, speed up new product certification and market authorisation in times of crisis.

Ensuring of sufficient supply of food, other essential goods and emergency products to the government sector and society is crucial in times of crisis or war. Private sector should help develop logistics solutions that ensure management, supply and stockpiling of essential locally produced food and industrial products during times of peace, crisis or war.

3. 6. 5. Industry

Latvia needs to continue rolling out policies and programs supporting the development of national defence and security industry and build close cooperation with its players. The primary objective of such support and cooperation with local economic actors is secure supply of materials, resources and assets essential for NAF, access to necessary resource management expertise and building of extended mobilisation resource pool according to NAF needs.

Meaningful and efficient support for the development of the industry requires clearly defined national priorities. These priorities have to be based on thorough analysis of national economic potential and NAF capability development priorities.

Current national-level priorities are development of unmanned systems, arms, maintenance of NAF support and combat vehicles and equipment, individual equipment systems and components, cyber security, information and communications systems.

3. 6. 6. Strategic partnerships

Meaningful and coordinated development of mobilisation resource pool, secure supply of materials, resources and services required for functioning of NAF based on national-level priorities, require strategic partnerships betwe-
en the sector organisations and defence industry players.

Strategic partnerships need to be created in priority areas such as maintenance of NAF combat vehicles and equipment, ammunition manufacturing and development of locally produced communication equipment to ensure security of supply during crisis or war.

Successful implementation of the Concept depends on prior cooperation between defence sector and industry players, availability of expertise, know-how, manufacturing assets and investments. Industry must also ensure compliance with legal requirements applicable to strategic goods manufacturers and suppliers.

Development of the strategic partnerships concept takes into account such considerations as gradual implementation of cooperation projects, integration with NAF reserve, mobilisation and comprehensive defence systems, National Guard, compliance with profit margin limiting rules, complete audits and readiness to invest in future development projects.

3. 6. 7. Research and innovation

Innovation is a crucial element of the development and competitiveness of national industry. Efficient transfer and implementation of innovative technologies will lead to significant boost of NAF capacity to deliver in terms of state defence despite limitations stemming from resource constraints faced by the sector.

Latvia needs to create a national innovation support framework and promote integration of national research and development frameworks into the scientific programmes of the EU and NATO to create a stronger environment for defence sector innovations. However, Latvia must also be aware of financial risks associated with R&D activities and implementation of technological innovations.

Innovation support measures must be aligned with national priorities and lead to new, ground-breaking technologies in fields with greater R&D potential at the national level.

3. 6. 8. Mobilisation

Testing framework established by the Mobilisation Law requires NAF to update Mobilisation Plan every year to reflect the current capability gaps and resources of the civilian sector required to ensure functions of NAF in case of mobilisation. In case of war, NAF may need to temporarily take over control of certain areas and properties necessary for NAF and allied force training, force integration, maintenance and tactical movements. Early identification of resource gaps is crucial in making sure appropriate mobilisation requests are being made.

Mobilisation levels of National Armed Forces
can be determined through snap mobilisation training, whereas mobilisation readiness and mobilisation personnel training require prior planning and delivery of such training in conjunction with business operators who have received mobilisation requests.

In case of crisis, economic operators must provide NAF and allied forces with all necessary support: power supply, medical services, civilian communications, catering and other services that are vital in performance of state defence tasks. Regular exercises and testing of economic operators’ readiness to mobilise is a must once relevant economic operators are trained and ready to meet their mobilisation objectives. Appropriate supply flexibility is also essential.
4. Concluding Remarks

Ministry of Defence shall finance the implementation of the State Defence Concept from the allocated sector funding.

State Defence Concept and NAF Development Plan form the basis for medium-term planning, including documents such as Defence Minister’s Guidelines for development of state defence framework and next year’s budget plans.

National Armed Forces development plans must contribute to continuity of the State Defence Concept. Plans must identify and consider NAF capabilities, which are critical in ensuring delivery of key components of state defence system.

Concept is the basis for Defence Minister’s Guidelines for development of state defence framework. These guidelines contain specific operational planning tasks that relevant unit commanders need to perform to enhance state defence.

According to National Security Law, State Defence Concept is approved by the Parliament at least once every election cycle, but not later than 1 October of the second year of the respective convocation.